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Air Traffic Control





Are air traffic controllers humans or people? At first sight, this seems a very odd
question, given that ‘humans’ and ‘people’ are near-synonyms in the dictionary
and everyday usage. However, in research on air traffic control (ATC)
automation the phrase ‘human-centred’ is used to mean particular aspects of
people: for example, it does not usually address their motivations for embracing
change or cover organisational behaviour issues. The objective here is to try to
understand how the fact that air traffic controllers are people – particular kinds of
people – is likely to affect the introduction of automation. This examination takes
as an example a suite of computer assistance tools for en route ATC. How would
these tools need to change if the fact that controllers are ‘people’ is taken into
account?
Some definitions and background references are necessary for the following
text. For simplicity, definitions and explanations of technical terms will be those
in ‘The Future of Air Traffic Control: Human Operators and Automation’
(CBASSE, 1998). This is an invaluable reference source, especially because it is
available in browsable Open Book format. One key definition is that of
‘automation’:
a device or system that accomplishes (partially or fully) a function that was
previously carried out (partially or fully) by a human operator.
This is a very broad statement: it covers both the introduction of computer
technology where it did not exist before and computer systems that possess some
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degree of autonomy. Automation in the context of engineering psychology is
reviewed by Wickens and Hollands (2000). A very valuable European
Commission project on ATC automation was RHEA – the ‘Role of the Human in
the Evolution of ATM Systems’ (Nijhuis, 2000).
The suite of computer assistance tools used to illustrate points is a subset of
those being developed through the Eurocontrol Organisation (Kauppinen (2003)
provides a brief description of the ‘ASA Tools’ programme of work). There are
some excellent review and research papers on these tools published by staff of
Eurocontrol’s Experimental Centre. These include Hilburn and Flynn (2001);
Kirwan (2001); Kirwan and Flynn (2002a); Kirwan and Flynn (2002); Pichancourt
and McGregor (2001).
Important research papers on these kinds of computer tools and automation
generally – a selection from a much larger number – are Farmer (2002): Leroux
(1997); Magill (1997); Pavet (2000); Printemps (2001); Swierstra and Green
(2003); Whysall (1998); and Wilson (2000).
There is an extensive literature on ‘function allocation’: selecting the right type
and level of automation, in particular deciding how to allocate tasks between
operators and automation. Fitts (1951) is the key early reference – note that the
topic was the ATC system! Bainbridge (1983) is a justifiably frequently quoted
paper. A whole issue (2000 (52), part 2) of the International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies was devoted to the topic, of which the paper by Sheridan (2000)
is probably the most relevant here. The concept of human-centred automation
mainly originated in Billings (1991).
Research on people’s motivation and the nature of job satisfaction tends to be
found in the (huge) organisational management literature. A good general source
is Mullins (2002), which inter alia refers to work by Maslow (on the hierarchy of
needs), Alderfer (ERG theory), Herzberg (motivation and performance), Vroom
and colleagues (Expectancy theory), and Hackman and Oldham
(meaningfulness/job enrichment). Mullins does not cover all the potential
research of interest here: an example is the work by Bruggemann and her
colleagues (1974 and 1976) on different kinds of work (or job) satisfaction
[Bruggemann’s work does not appear to be in English translation, but its main
points are summarised in the very useful notes by Lauche (2002)]. Kohler (1997)
provides a history of team working experiments and developments. Buchanan
(2005) summarises recent USA work on employees’ ‘engagement’. Costa (1995)
reviews the sources and consequences of stress in air traffic control.
Psychological studies on occupational interests and personality types are most
frequently encountered as commercial products. An example is the Louisiana
Integrated Skills Assessment (2005). Original sources for these tests include
Holland (1985) and Kuder (1977).
There are extensive quotes from this literature in the following. Spellings have
been changed to UK English and obvious typing errors corrected. References
identified in quotes are those given in the original source material.
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The computer assistance tools example
A Eurocontrol programme of research and development into operational concept
using controller tools is currently in progress (Eurocontrol, 2005). From the
published literature, it is probably the most comprehensive programme world-
wide on this topic. The programme is entitled ASA: Automated Support to Air
Traffic Management (ATM). A subset of the tools is used here to illustrate the
points being made. This subset leads up to and includes the Conflict Resolution
Assistant (CORA), which aims to provide a support tool to en route controllers
(i.e. away from airport operations) in the area of conflict resolution. This suite of
‘CORA Tools’ is sketched in Kauppinen (2003).
A key element must be the detection of potential conflicts. These occur when
flightpaths – used here to mean the entire space and time representation of a flight
– come into conflict. Thus, at the heart of this process must be some prediction of
the flightpath, a basis for the user tools. The tools that lead up to CORA are:
 TP (Trajectory Predictor) predicts the routes of the aircraft and hence
determines, within accuracy and uncertainty bounds, the likely conflict
regions and conflicting aircraft. [The accuracy of MTCD below, and
ultimately the usefulness of CORA, depends critically on the performance
of TP.]
 MONA (Monitoring Aid) checks for non-conformances of aircraft after they
have received instructions (e.g. a heading or altitude change) or other
deviations from their intended flight routing.
 MTCD (Medium Term Conflict Detection) detects potential conflicts. It is
medium term, by which is meant that it looks up to 20 minutes ahead. It
detects conflicts between all the aircraft pairs examined. It does not provide
advice to controllers on what to do about conflicts where they are detected.
The main objective in using the tools is to increase the safe throughput of the
ATC system. Thus, the average taskload per aircraft for a controller team has to
reduce significantly by the use of the tools (Brooker (2003) provides background
and key references on taskload and related ATC topics). It needs be stressed again
that tool usage needs – at the very least – to maintain the safety of the ATC
system.
These tools are general in nature, i.e. can be adapted for different kinds of
airspace structure and controller organisation. For present purposes, the following
is assumed (a considerable simplification of the controller team arrangements):
Airspace is divided into sectors. Each has a planning controller (PC) and a
tactical controller (TC)
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The PC has to coordinate and agree entry and exit of flights into the sector,
usually by telephone. PCs try to find the flightpaths, e.g. identify flight levels,
that are least likely to generate potential conflicts as the flight progresses.
The TC communicates with the aircrew by radio telephone, accepts the aircraft
into the sector, monitors its progress, detects possible conflicts in the sector, issues
instructions to eliminate these conflicts, and achieves the exit conditions set by the
PC.
Generally, the TC is more highly loaded than the PC. The aims of the ASA
toolset are to reduce and rebalance taskload.
How can taskload be reduced? Divide the course of a flight into upstream –
earlier times – and downstream – later times. If there is a conflict now
downstream, could it have been ‘designed out’ upstream, i.e. the PC could have
detected the potential conflict and made better coordination arrangements? This
reduces the TC taskload by removing some elements of conflict detection and
resolution taskload.
A variety of CORA tool types could exist, and are the subject of ongoing
research. The simplest version is described in Kirwan and Flynn (2002b). The
following is an edited version of parts of that report explaining CORA:
CORA builds upon MTCD.
It will offer a set of ranked resolutions to the en route controllers, principally
the PC.
The controller may select the highest ranked resolution for implementation,
or a lower ranked one if that is judged to be more appropriate.
Alternatively, the controller may reject all of the suggested resolutions in
favour of a new controller-generated resolution.
CORA is not intended to replace the controller’s skill of conflict resolution,
but rather is meant to support it and extend the controller’s abilities and
capacity for handling more traffic safely and expeditiously.
None of the ASA tools or concepts is aimed at replacing the controller.
Their role is to enhance the planning ability of ATM, with the controller
remaining at the heart of that planning process, albeit assisted by a variety
of integrated tools.
This planning focus means a greater ‘look ahead’ time generally in ATM,
and a particular aspect to keep in mind throughout this current review is
that the intended ‘look-ahead’ time for CORA is 10 – 20 minutes (somewhat
longer than many current ATM practices). The degree to which current en
route controller strategies can be extrapolated to longer look ahead times
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therefore needs to be examined at some point before using such strategies to
generate conflict resolution algorithms.
The comment in the final paragraph is important from a technical viewpoint of
Tools development (Magill, 1997; Swierstra, and Green, 2003). There are errors
of various kinds when forward projections are made of an aircraft’s flightpath, and
these uncertainties limit TP performance and hence that of CORA Tools.
Human-centred automation and CORA tools
The philosophy of human-centred automation is characterized by CBASSE (1998)
as including:
The choice of what to automate should be guided by the need to compensate
for human vulnerabilities and to exploit human strengths.
The development of the automated tools should proceed with the active
involvement of both users and trained human factors practitioners.
The evaluation of such tools should be carried out with human-in-the-loop
simulation and careful experimental design.
The introduction of these tools into the workplace should proceed gradually,
with adequate attention given to user training, to facility differences, and to
user requirements.
The operational experience from initial introduction should be very carefully
monitored, with mechanisms in place to respond rapidly to the lessons
learned from the experiences.
This is a very challenging list. None of the statements is simple (e.g. the
complexity of developing simulation trials and understanding their results is
discussed in Dubey (2000)).
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 Key design driver is capabilities and deficiencies of end user
 Controllers are limited capacity information processors
 Controllers inherently make some mistakes/errors
 Controllers must work with other controllers
 Controllers are different
 Controllers cannot easily be changed
 Must fit the person to the job and the job to the person
 Must learn from system failures
Figure 1 Human-centred design recipe components
Human-centred design needs guidelines and rules-of-thumb. Figure 1 shows a
list of some of the more obvious components, which are compatible with the
CBASSE list.
It is interesting that the word ‘human’ is used here. No normal 21st century
manager using UK or USA English idiomatically would speak of a staff or team
composed of humans. Grammarians use the word ‘synecdoche’ when a part of
something is used to represent the whole. Thus, in 19th century Britain, the people
working in a factory would have been called its ‘hands’, a rather cold – demeaning
– way of referring to people.
The RHEA work (Nijhuis, 2000) provides a good summary of human factors
work on ATC automation (see also Farmer, 2002). It did in fact bring into
consideration the kinds of people aspects, such as motivation and job satisfaction,
that are of interest here. For example, it rejected some options for automation
because operators would be ‘out of control’, and so lose job satisfaction, and that
that they would de-skill the controller, and hence put safety at risk if the system
fails.
A key issue in the introduction of automated systems was seen to be the level of
operator trust. Of the various levels of automation considered, the best option, in
the present context of CORA Tools, was one in which the system gave advice for
acceptance or rejection by the controller. This was considered to be most
workable when the advisory system was consistent with the controller’s own
mental model. For the CORA Tools, Kirwan and Flynn (2002) investigated these
mental model aspects – the explicit rules that controllers pay attention to, the
implicit strategies they adopt when solving conflicts, and the factors that
controllers consider when carrying out conflict resolution.)
But note that even this ‘best’ ‘Machine Proposal Strategy’ has both benefits and
drawbacks (Nijhuis, 2000):
The system suggests ‘solutions’ that the controller may choose to implement
or not.
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 Benefits: save human resources, remains indifferent to traffic load,
never fails to consider side-effects of actions, overcomes any
narrowing of situation awareness or tunnel-vision
 Drawbacks: work overload because of under-confidence in the output
of the system, more superficial situation awareness, loss of core skills,
loss of flexibility, possible complacency by over-confidence in the
output of the system.
CORA has been developed in ways that inter alia attempt to eliminate or
reduce the drawbacks identified here. In particular, problems with situational
awareness are mitigated by making CORA a tool for use by the PC rather than the
TC. The report on the Eurocontrol real-time simulation study (Pichancourt and
McGregor, 2001) conclusions section includes the following comments.
The most highly commended tools were the DFL (Dynamic Flight Leg), the
PAC (Planned Alternative Clearance), and the Interfering Aircraft Filtering
function. These tools enhanced traffic situational awareness, assisted the
Planning Controller in solving problems earlier, and permitted the
optimisation of flights.
Participants were agreed on the usefulness of the Medium Term Conflict
Detection (MTCD), however they felt the rate of false and missed alerts must
be improved.
Improvements are required in the quality of trajectory prediction, but also
the HMI presented in the Potential Problem Display (PPD) and the Planned
Activity Display (PAD).
To maintain confidence, the Tactical Controller must continuously
crosscheck their problem detection with that of the system. The controllers
did not wish to be system driven. The potential risk of over-trust (and a lack
of situation awareness building) must be anticipated and managed…
Participants identified the risk of controller de-skilling in problem detection
as a problem. To a certain extent as the controller is still responsible for
resolution design (with the support of the filtering function), the deskilling is
potentially reduced. The risk could be that the controllers over-rely on the
system and end up system driven…
Controller concerns about automation
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Air traffic controllers are generally in secure jobs with reasonable salaries and
pensions. Controllers would not be expected to rush to implement things that
would put them out of a job. Nor would they be expected to rush to implement
changes that de-skill their role. This obviously colours how they view
automation, even human-centred automation. The lengthy training programme for
controllers, including the need for validating their skills operationally, means that
there are significant ‘barriers to entry’ in the profession. There is not a simple
labour market for en route controllers. In economic jargon, the provision of ATC
services and hence controller employment is not readily contestable. As a general
rule, controllers cannot be forced into using new skills by the threat of job losses
or competition by firms using new technology and practices (compare newspaper
publishing’s move from ‘hot metal’ typesetting to the new technology ‘cold type’
(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2005)).
The kinds of concerns about automation (in the largest sense) voiced by
controllers were encapsulated a decade ago in an International Labour Office
review by Costa (1995):
There is a justifiable concern for increased human boredom, decreased
motivation, loss of situational awareness, over-reliance on and misuse of
automated systems, and deterioration of skill.…Regarding information
processing, it has to be taken into account that the cognitive competence of
controllers consists of simultaneously mastering part of the procedure by
application and/or adaptation type. For the moment, it is the controllers
themselves who ‘decide’ about this division according to their personality
and cognitive structure. With automated workstations, this division will be
taken over by the machine, and the controller will then only need to apply or
adapt. Some may suffer from this and gain the impression that they can no
longer pursue their own logic independently, that they are losing landmarks
in their reasoning and that they can no longer think in a reliable manner.
…[W]hat is the limit beyond which the controller will have the impression
that his powers of decision are being ‘stolen’ from him? How far can one go
in letting him control the process of deciding and not simply ‘speaking the
right information into the microphone’? The answer to the question is not
an easy one, since it is difficult to find the balance between the stress
alleviation by increasing the security of the man/machine system, and the
reduced involvement which reduces security through a drop of vigilance.
More recently, the UK’s Guild of Air Traffic Control Officers issued a policy
statement on automation (GATCO, 2003), with Conclusions as:
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It is the case that the impact of automation will cause a change of role and
that the change will make it unwise for controllers to continue to accept
responsibilities that will become increasingly difficult to fulfil.
The increasing use of controller tools, and the evolution to a task driven role
could impair a controllers ‘picture’ and make a controller increasingly
dependent on automation.
System algorithms and logic, designed by scientists and engineers, are often
at variance with the mental processes of controllers. Although a machine
and a controller may have designed the same solution, the process by which
a machine develops its conclusions is not necessarily obvious or logical to a
controller. This makes it difficult for a controller to validate the output of
automation, even if the controller had time to do so.
Peak traffic levels will be sustainable only with the contribution of
automation. In the event of a catastrophic system failure under peak traffic
conditions, a controller’s ability to provide an effective manual recover will
be so limited that an alternative approach should be considered and
implemented.
[It is worth noting that the third of these should not be deemed to apply to the
Eurocontrol work on CORA, where a considerable amount of effort has been
expended by research teams – including controllers – to match ‘automation
solutions’ to those of controllers (Kirwan and Flynn, 2002a/b).]
A very important appreciation of progress in ATC automation in France has
been given by Printemps (2001). The French ATC organisation has put
considerable investment and resource into this kind of development, so these
lessons from French experts have considerable value:
 Main benefit of automation The average number of flights a controller can
handle has not increased, and even has decreased compared to the situation
30 years ago one could ask whether there is any benefit to automation…the
main benefit of automation has been to permit a safe increase of the number
of sectors, and to permit more complex sector definition and route patterns
(it is not only a volume of airspace, but rather a set of possible trajectories
and coordination rules). Consequently, it has become possible to handle a
much higher traffic.
 A revolution is no longer possible The first lesson that emerge from the past
experience is that in ATM automation a revolution is no longer possible
(unless you accept strong disruptions in air transport). Twice, in France, it
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was attempted to go for a radical change, twice it has been necessary to go
back for a smoother transition.
 Flight data input are kept to the strict minimum Automation up to now has
help the controller to filter and get easily the information required to build
this mental picture. French controller has been quite demanding in the man
machine interface, and in particular the input in the computer that are
necessary…It is also recognized that providing advanced automation will
require that the computer get access to these data known only by the
controller, and that are generally written on the paper strip.
 Each automation elementary step must bring in direct benefit Controllers
will not appropriate and/or use a functionality that does not bring a direct
benefit to them. Of course you can impose them a new function and they
may not have any other choice than using it. However the automation
strategy should avoid such scenario.
 In the field trials are a key to success Since the mid seventies all major new
functionalities has been introduced after a long period of real time
simulations followed by trials in operational centres using live data…The
appropriation of the tools by the controller is a complex process, sometime
surprising.
 Increase safety first The main objective, as seen by a manager, is to
increase capacity at an acceptable cost…But increasing capacity of the
control position itself cannot be separated from increasing safety of the
work of the controller. Safety and capacity are considered to be the two
faces of the same coin. If tools are given to the controller to increase the
safety of its working environment, capacity will consequently increase.
The current French plans for automation focus on the ERATO project – which
has similarities to the CORA Tools (see Printemps (2001), Leroux (1997)).
Motivation, organisational behaviour and job satisfaction
A distinction was drawn earlier between ‘humans’ and ‘people’. The key point –
and this is probably worth repeating ad nauseam – is that research work on
human-centred ATC automation does not generally cover organisational,
motivational or job satisfaction aspects. CBASSE (1998) notes:
For some in the general public the introduction of automation is synonymous
with job elimination and worker displacement. In fact, in popular writing,
this view leads to concerns that automation is something to be wary or even
fearful of. While we acknowledge that automation can have negative,
neutral, or even positive implications for job security and worker morale,
these issues are not the focus of this report.
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It is interesting to note the phrases ‘general public’ and ‘popular writing’ in this
extract: they seem to be used pejoratively. If they are not to be the focus of this –
the CBASSE book – then where are they supposed to be dealt with? Later on in
the book, there is a paragraph on user acceptance:
As with many sophisticated forms of automation, if systems like these are not
carefully designed and introduced with adequate concern for controller
training, the potential exists for limited user acceptance to threaten job
satisfaction, which may in turn be reflected in perceived job insecurity. The
more capable such automated systems are, the more likely such fears
become. Furthermore, history suggests that such fears are not always
unwarranted; in 1982, the FAA’s modernization plans were presented to the
U.S. Congress with the promise that they would reduce future staffing
requirements (Stix, 1994). Some also fear that advanced air traffic control
automation, if not well-designed, may erode the job satisfaction a controller
derives from resolving a challenging situation (Harwood, 1993).
Thus, these comments note the relevance of these factors, but do not attempt to
address them as an important aspect of psychology in the broadest sense.
CBASSE (1998) does also refer to the work of Wiener and Curry (1980 et seq) on
job dissatisfaction in pilots [to be covered later here]. Note also that Wickens and
Hollands (2000) has no entries for motivational or job satisfaction in its index.
The crucial point is that these ‘people’ aspects are not second order effects,
somehow to be ‘worked around’. The introduction of automation has to be
viewed in a holistic fashion. It is not sufficient to create pieces of automation and
expect that these are modules to replace existing processes: the organisation and
the nature of the jobs within it have to be redesigned. If this is not done, then the
pace of beneficial automation – helping more aircraft to fly safely through
currently congested airspace – will be slow. Controllers will be reluctant to use
new tools and, even when they are introduced, they may not use them to their full
potential. [A quote from a Tools expert: ‘great in low level traffic conditions to
keep the controllers amused at idle moments, but, as soon as it gets hectic,
controllers ignore the Tool because “they have work to do”’.)
The motivation and job satisfaction issues are obvious ones. If the controller is
presented with a proposed conflict solution, then where is the skill in just agreeing
to it? If the controller’s job if just to sit and watch the screen until something
peculiar happens, then the job becomes rather tedious. It is one thing learning
certain rules and then applying them: it is another thing entirely when one works
to a pre-programmed script, having to operate without much freedom or
discretion.
Part of the problem is that controllers are people and part is because they tend
to be particular kinds of people. People-problems with work motivation and job
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satisfaction have been studied for many years, e.g. see Mullins (2002). There are
many theories and criteria for job design about this aspect of psychology, as noted
in the Introduction. Some people criteria that relate to controllers and automation
include:
 Alienation: the need for a worker to perceive that his or her part of the
production process is important.
 Autonomy: ‘experienced responsibility’ – note that controllers generally
work in long-standing teams and tend to refer operational decisions upwards
to supervisors in exceptional cases, where atypical safety problems need
resolution over a wider airspace dimension.
 Feedback: ‘knowledge of results’ – the controller immediately sees that
aircraft are moving smoothly through the sector on reasonable flightpaths.
 Task completeness: the controller knows and deals with the full problem,
and thus can justifiably feel responsible.
 Process Control: the controller has a choice about what means to use to
solve problems.
The human-centred approach to automation using CORA Tools sketched in the
earlier sections certainly makes use these kinds of criteria.
Controllers are particular kinds of people. Controllers need to have specific
abilities, e.g. spatial awareness, and as a group tend to show particular
occupational interests and preferences – to have a particular personality type or
pattern (e.g. Holland (1985) and Kuder (1977)). Occupational psychology may
not have the academic prestige of cognitive or engineering psychology, but it has
undoubtedly had major effects on vocational planning and employee selection.
It is hardly surprising that controllers need to be stable and dependable
individuals, but the collected characteristics of their general personality type are
very interesting. From the Louisiana Integrated Skills Assessment (2005):
According to Holland’s interest theory, Air Traffic Controllers are
classified primarily as Conventional. People with Conventional interests
like work activities that follow set procedures and routines. They prefer
working with data and detail more than with ideas. They prefer work in
which there are precise standards rather than work in which you have to
judge things by yourself. These people like working where the lines of
authority are clear. The second Holland category is Realistic. People with
Realistic interests like work activities that include practical, hands-on
problems and solutions…
The highest Work Values for Air Traffic Controllers include Achievement and
Support. The Achievement Work Value is associated with jobs that let
workers use their best abilities, see the results of their efforts and get the
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feeling of accomplishment. The Support Work Value is associated with jobs
where the company stands behind its workers and where the workers are
comfortable with management’s style of supervision. These companies
typically have a reputation for competent, considerate, and fair management.
Automation does not per se damage the characteristics noted in the first
paragraph of this extract, but it causes great problems for the Achievement
elements in the second paragraph. Controllers see themselves as skilled
professionals, and so are very alert to anything that might downgrade their status.
How to make progress?
It would be wrong simply to suppose that controllers are in general intrinsically
opposed to automation. As part of the CORA Tools work, Hilburn and Flynn
(2001) carried out studies into controller attitudes to automation. To quote two
points from their work:
Much of what emerged from these data does not agree with the stereotypical
view of the air traffic controller as over-stressed recalcitrant neo-luddite.
Indeed, the involved controllers all recognised and respected the need for new
forms of ATC automation.
Controller acceptance is likely to be much higher if justifications for change
are accompanied by demonstrable benefits, preferably early in the design
cycle (e.g. via prototypes). Controllers are generally aware of the need for
new systems, if only to handle increasing traffic loads. By and large, the
consensus view was simply that they wanted some assurance, in advance of
operational use, that new tools would be useful and reliable.
So, given all the research work carried out into ATC automation, what is
needed to fill the gaps identified in the previous section in terms of motivation,
work satisfaction and controller personality traits? How can people be motivated
to embrace changes in operating practices and to use automation tools effectively?
What needs to be done for controllers to believe that their Work Values of
Achievement and Support are being enhanced? The following sets out some
thoughts rather than a set of simple recipes: this is a tough problem to solve.
As already noted, there is an extensive literature of this topic. Mullins (2002)
sketches out the main theories of Maslow, Alderfer, Herzberg, Vroom, Hackman
and Oldham; while there is ongoing work on the subject, e.g. Bruggemann
(1974/1976). The following text highlights some of the most relevant points and
theories about peoples’ motivation.
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Motivation covers a variety of things. From the ‘outside’, it is a willingness to
exert effort to meet particular organisation goals. From the ‘inside’, it is a need
within the person that means that certain work outcomes appear attractive. What
are these needs and how do people’s needs differ?
Alderfer’s simple ‘ERG’ theory of needs is a simple categorisation into:
 Existence needs – food, shelter, etc
 Relatedness needs – good interpersonal relations, open communication, etc
 Growth needs – self-development/creative/productive work
How would a controller’s needs be split between these three? In the present
context, it hardly matters: the key point is that automation, even of the human-
centred CORA Tools variety, deals a blow to the Growth needs.
Would some kind of goal-setting do the trick? By goal-setting is simply meant
that individuals are presented with something that compares their present
performance with that needed to achieve particular goals. Some of the
organisational criteria for goal-setting to work would be met: the CORA Tools
package is within the capabilities of controllers; it is feasible to give feedback on
performance (e.g. traffic handled, economic flight paths); it is possible to make
goals specific. But there is the major problem of acceptance of and commitment
to the goal. For example, controllers could certainly be paid more for attaining the
goal, but would they judge it to be an achievement; would they believe that they
were ‘in control’ or just ‘a cog in the machine’? Given the controllers’ Support
Work Value, an over-emphasis on reward (and punishment?), or with the process
being seen as controlled from the top, would probably be viewed negatively.
Expectancy theory defines three new terms (figure 2), with the belief that
high ratings on these factors will result in improved performance.
Process theory about work motivation – focuses on how people
make choices re behaviours and effort:
 Valence: desirability of an outcome to an individual.
 Instrumentality: perception about the extent to which
performance of one or more behaviours will lead to the
attainment of a particular outcome
 Expectancy: a perception about the extent to which effort will
result in a certain level of performance
Figure 2 Expectancy theory
Bruggemann’s work (1974, 1976) is in some ways a development of
Expectancy Theory. It focuses on different need levels that may or may not be
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fulfilled in the current work situation. People’s evaluation of the situation will
result in satisfaction or dissatisfaction, influenced by the expectancy level.
Bruggemann identifies unhealthy organisations when people have a distorted
perception of the work situation or where they stop looking for new solutions to
problems. This feeds back to the controllers Achievement and Support Work
Values.
One possible avenue is to focus on safety. As Printemps noted above: ‘If tools
are given to the controller to increase the safety of its working environment,
capacity will consequently increase’. As noted earlier, the CORA Tools are
‘marketed’ as increasing capacity by rebalancing workload, but they do in fact do
this by helping to filter out for the TC a sizable proportion of potential aircraft
conflicts. Has this filtering role received enough attention? As Hilburn and Flynn
(2001) note, the value of short term conflict alert warnings is now well
established, so could not the safety dimension of CORA Tools be made much
more explicit?
One key feature surely has to be for Tools to be seen as requiring expertise in
their use, i.e. the controller gains an extra skill. Because there is this new skill, the
controller should get paid significantly more for using this additional
rating/validation (which picks up the earlier comments about goal-setting). Some
more pay for controllers is a bargain for airspace users if he/she can deliver real
benefits to flights. But the controller has to demonstrate operationally that he/she
can handle more traffic, or, that at the same traffic rate as at present, a higher
percentage of aircraft get fuel-efficient flight paths.
If this were to be the way forward, then there are some consequences. The
Tool has to be of ‘interrogation’ form: the controller uses his/her initiative to test
from a small sub-set of options, including seeing their different benefits to flights
(compare the Printemps (2001) and Hilburn and Flynn (2001) conclusions re
benefits). The Tool has to provide indications to the controller if his/her choice
might cause downstream problems or is potentially slightly ‘risky’ (e.g. if the
option’s projected flightpaths use something near to the minimum safe separation
and so require workload from the TC in ensuring that required separation is
maintained). Data entry of changes to flightpath/intent has to be a necessary
ingredient of Tool usage – otherwise the system TP projections, and hence
everything else in the CORA Tools, will be of poor quality (see Eurocontrol
Learning Server, 2005). Thus, for example, the controller would (say) have to
click a mouse on the Tools display to confirm that a particular instruction had
been issued.
A further strand would be to examine the lessons learned from the introduction
of flightdeck automation (e.g. Flight Deck Automation Issues, 2003). These have
some positive elements, e.g. to quote CBASSE (1998):
The question of job satisfaction in a highly automated environment was first
raised by Wiener and Curry (1980). Since then, both authors have stated
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that in their field studies they found no trace of automation-induced apathy
or job dissatisfaction (Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1985, 1989). If anything, pilots
seem to be proud to be flying a modern aircraft and highly satisfied with the
job. However, it should be noted that satisfaction with the automation
provided by the FMS can vary greatly, depending on the attitude fostered by
airline management (McClumpha and James, 1994).
The word ‘proud’ stands out in this extract. So, the controller has to believe
that he or she has ‘moved up a gear’, and not just to believe this as a piece of
successful management propaganda but as a valid description of a newly
challenging job that delivers a safe product.
Lessons
There is no doubt that excellent work has been done into ATC automation from
the viewpoint of engineering psychology. The problem is that this approach may
produce comparatively little of practical usage – or perhaps it will just take a very
long time for implementation? Progress requires organisational and personality
psychological aspects to be incorporated in a holistic exercise.
Aviation has made most of its technological advances by adopting scientific
reductionism: breaking the big problems down into smaller, more easily
addressed, ‘chunks’ and then solving each these. The modern aviation industry
demonstrates the success of this methodology. Psychology has usually followed
this approach, looking hard at the cause and effect relationships in the separate
chunks. The difficulty here is that the various psychological chunks have not
received comparable or consistent attention; nor have they been integrated
together.
A metaphor is that of a food manufacturer whose researchers produce a
nutritionally efficient packaged meal, but which has a bland taste and cannot be
consumed at the same time as alcohol. What would the take-up of such a product
be? Abstemious health-orientated individuals would no doubt like it, but the
majority of people would not. There would be little incentive for the majority to
buy it as long as people had a choice. If circumstances were desperate and a
dictatorial government could impose its consumption, then things would be
different – but that is not how people live in the developed world or a good model
for changing how controllers work in ATC organisations.
The problems identified here are not new ones. If there is a new problem, it is
that past research results are not being fully incorporated into current thinking and
research. A striking example is given in Whitfield (1982), which summarises
human factors issues arising during eight years of systems research into computer-
based concepts (carried out by the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment and
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Aston University on behalf of the UK Civil Aviation Authority). Whitfield’s
Conclusions include:
Intrinsic motivation and satisfaction for controllers comes from tasks which
provide a challenge, and on which effective performance leads to feelings of
competence and achievement.
Automation of entire functions, or the provision of computer-aiding with
some functions, might be acceptable to controllers if the need was perceived
by them and if the overall job still retained a balance of challenging and
more routine tasks. Certainly, boredom or lack of satisfaction in some tasks
can be compensated by the existence of challenge in others.
These are as vital now as they were then.
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